PM Modi’s decision to purchase 36 Rafale fighters ‘off the shelf’ from Dassault and the promise to buy another 30 without a tech-transfer regenerated a new debate on not just India’s vulnerable security and its vastly-depleted air cover but the need for a proactive PM like Modi to plug the lacunae in our defence
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to buy 36 Rafale multi-role fighter jets off-the-shelf from France in a government-government deal was a surprise, but it was timely and bold, putting at rest rumors and debates that tend to show the country and its decision-making process in poor light.
We must understand why we got into a situation in which we had to abandon a more than 15-year long process to acquire fighters for the air force and finally take a different path, something no nation can afford to do repeatedly if it’s to defend its borders and undertake military missions.
The possibility of having to import combat aircraft for the IAF became a reality after a review of the Project Definition Phase of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, later to be named Tejas, in 1993/94.
With the LCA thus delayed and unavailable to replace the depleting and ageing fleet of MiGs in the IAF, the status of combat aircraft inventory started to get critical. The capability gaps created by the retiring fleet could not be augmented adequately, although upgrading MIG-21s, Jaguars and the gradual induction of Sukhoi fighters helped ensure aircraft availability for missions. Around 20 used MIG-21 two-seaters (from Russia and Central Asian Republic) were procured as a desperate measure to fill the gap of a supersonic combat trainer. The IAF even got permission to explore the possibility of procuring used Mirage-2000 from UAE / Qatar, but even as France was on the verge of shutting down the production line of the Mirage-2000, a light combat aircraft that had served well and buying more of which was the first option considered by the IAF, the used Mirage fighters from UAE / Qatar were not found to be a cost-effective option.
That was when the Rafale fighter was examined as a possibility (This was around time that American fighters were still out-of-bounds for India). Simultaneously, information was obtained on status of development of Gripen, a design that was closest to the Light Combat Aircraft. The Euro-Fighter Typhoon had still a long way to go and was not even on offer at the time. The Ministry of Defence was informed of the necessity to augment the fighter fleet through import. Had the LCA come up on time, perhaps we would not have gotten into the acquisition process for the Medium Multi- Role Combat Aircraft, as the competition for the multi-billion dollar deal came to be known, for at least another 10 years or so, until a new exigency arose.
Many are now saying that we could have done better by buying more Sukhoi aircraft, but the Su-30MKI is a large aircraft (over 30 tons) and has extensive capability. When we bought them, it was a new concept for IAF which took a cautious approach, initially limiting orders to around 40, and gradually increasing the numbers.
But the Air Force needed a large number of smaller and lighter combat aircraft of MIG-21 / LCA class. The Request for Proposal for what was initially 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) then became one that added on medium-weight aircraft, too, encompassing a variety – from the Gripen- an LCA class fighter to the F-16 and Mirage-2000 class, the F-18 improved variant was possibly as big as the SU-30MKI and the Rafale and Euro Fighter Typhoon that were larger than the F-16s and two-engined. These last two being from the latest vintage, employed more advanced engineering and design offering capabilities and flexibility not envisaged before.
That is about the time when the strategic situation was undergoing change – Pakistan was not the only adversary and crossing the Himalayas posed more challenges. It was an even greater challenge for the MOD, facing severe budgetary constraints for modernization of the military and not just the Air Force alone. The government was constantly under fire.
The number 126 as the requirement of number of fighters is magical, typically arrived at by MOD Finance to limit the numbers, after considering the Air Force’s demand. Oddly, such numbers somehow appear authentic — 66 AJT, 76 Jaguars, 106 more Pilatus, 36 Rafale etc (ending in 6 may have been considered lucky!). These numbers never made sense. We built more Jaguars and ordered additional Hawks. There are good reasons to believe more Rafale jets will follow the current 36 to be ordered. In fact, it is difficult to sustain two Squadrons with 36, since that number does not leave reserves for maintenance/repair. Experience shows that it is easier to push additional orders if the aircraft is produced in India under licence. (We placed additional orders of HS-748 and Dornier 228 just to keep HAL going).
But has licence manufacture, as the original plan for 126 Rafale jets was, helped to ‘Make in India’? The answer is ‘Yes’ since technically these would be made in India. But does it promise self-reliance? The answer is an emphatic NO. Hundreds of licence manufacture of MIG series, Jaguars, Hawk, Su-30MKI in no way helped in developing and manufacturing indigenous design. Processes and machines acquired for licence manufacture have had limited usage once the line is closed.Production technology in no way helps to design and develop. Importantly, the total cost of licence manufacture is far more than direct purchase since it also included IPR, documents, travel and support, training etc. Direct purchase has least risks, is least expensive and if Off-Set clauses are applied (that would also cost) could help develop domestic small and medium enterprises.
The Rafale experience should therefore teach us that we need to be self-reliant. And the only way to reach achieve self-reliance is to design and produce from scratch – intelligently applying knowledge and developing skills on the way. ‘To Evolve’ is the key. We could always hire experts from anywhere in the world when needed as we did to develop the Marut or the ALH.
Developing and producing indigenously is a matter of pride. HT-2, HPT-32, Marut, ALH, LCH, LCA etc generated very special enthusiasm and pride. We are capable of meeting all our requirements of ‘Light Helicopters’ and Trainer aircraft but the push for import is discouraging. What could be the reasons?
We have no faith in our own ability to design and produce by specified time, to the performance desired and at the cost envisaged. No one seems accountable. The military has little say in projects once initiated. Often, the frustration turns on the Users. The military is the user and it is not their decision to buy or make. That is the privilege of the government. Today, the Intermediate Jet Trainer is languishing – a relatively simple design. Our most strategic need to develop a Jet Engine has consumed billions of rupees but it seems to be heading nowhere. The Air Force cannot push any of these projects!
We are not sure what lies beyond the order for 36 Rafal jets. I am one of the optimists. All stars appear favorable; we have capable leadership whom we must trust. We must invest in a big way in the LCA Mk-II, the ALH, LCH, LUH and all the rest that are to follow. We should no longer import things that we can design and make ourselves. Accountability must be ruthlessly enforced and initiative must be encouraged. The user – the Indian military — must be firmly in the saddle to drive their programs. Indian Aeronautics keenly awaits a new dawn. We must not miss this opportunity.
